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409 
Drought By Fifth Amendment: Debunking Water 
Rights as “Real” Property 
“The wars of the twenty-first century will be 
fought over water.” 
–Ismail Sergaldein1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The West is experiencing a water crisis.2 Extreme and severe 
drought has taken hold in California, Nevada, Utah, Washington, 
and Oregon,3 brought on by dry weather and rising population.4 Cal-
ifornia reported record levels of drought with “water supplies . . . se-
verely depleted . . . record low snowpack in the Sierra Nevada moun-
tains, decreased water levels in most of California’s reservoirs, 
reduced flows in the state’s rivers and shrinking supplies in under-
ground water basins.”5 California, in its sixth year of drought, re-
sponded with substantial water restrictions aimed at reducing con-
 
 1. Ismail Sergldein is the former Chairman of the Global Water Partnership. See ALEX 
PRUD’HOMME, THE RIPPLE EFFECT: THE FATE OF FRESHWATER IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 12 (2012). 
 2. U.S.D.A., UNITED STATES DROUGHT MONITOR, http://droughtmonitor.unl.edu 
(last updated Apr. 4, 2017). 
 3. NOAA NAT’L CTRS. ENV’T INFO., STATE OF THE CLIMATE: NAT’L OVERVIEW 
FOR AUG. 2015 (Sept. 2015), http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/national/201508. The problem is 
also prominent in Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, and Montana, which have also re-
ported lower than normal water levels. Id. Almost sixty percent of the West is suffering from 
moderate to severe drought. Id. 
 4. Benjamin I. Cook, et al., Unprecedented 21st Century Drought Risk in the Ameri-
can Southwest and Central Plains, SCI. ADVANCES, (Feb. 12, 2015), http://advances 
.sciencemag.org/content/1/1/e1400082. 
 5. Cal. Exec. Order No. B-29-15 (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs 
/4.1.15_Executive_ Order.pdf. Although California experienced higher levels of precipitation in 
2016, drought persists in California and other Western states as a result of above-normal tem-
peratures. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration holds the above-normal 
temperatures result in “very wet episodes during some months in some regions. These wet 
events mask some of the dry episodes on the statewide-scale and seasonal-scale analyses.” 
NOAA NAT’L CTRS. ENV’T INFO, DROUGHT – ANNUAL 2016, (Jan. 2017), 
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/drought/201613#west-sect; see also Darryl Fears, Has this 
year’s record rain finally ended California’s epic drought? Not really., WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 
2017, 3:55 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/02/13/ 
has-this-years-record-rain-finally-ended-californias-epic-drought-not-really/?utm_term=.495 
e1daa4140. 
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sumption.6 These restrictions have yet to be enforced. Rather, dis-
putes have escalated regarding the extent to which the state can re-
strict water usage, specifically in the Central Valley region, which is 
predominately agricultural and the dominant user of California’s wa-
ter.7In 2015, water rights holders, whose rights to draw from rivers 
and streams were curtailed,8 filed lawsuits against the State Water 
Board on claims of constitutional violations.9 The response in Cali-
fornia to its water crisis is a sign of what is to come in other western 
states as they struggle to address the need for water conservation. In 
fact, most states have commenced conservation efforts. Utah com-
missioned a fifty-year water plan and urged water conservation after a 
decline in its snowpack;10 Nevada is moving towards changes in water 
law to incentivize conservation as Lake Mead, which services ninety 
percent of Las Vegas’ water needs, experiences lower-than-average 
water levels;11and Arizona issued a state water plan to address how 
dwindling supply will meet its ever growing population.12 Yet, as 
states move to assert more control over water resources, there may be 
 
 6. Cal. Exec. Order No. B-29-15 (Apr. 1, 2015); see also Darryl Fears, California Offi-
cials Say a New Plan Will Make Water Conservation ‘A Way of Life,’ WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/california-officials-say-a-new-
plan-will-make-water-conservation-a-way-of-life/2016/12/31/0afb79a2-c869-11e6-bf4b-
2c064d32a4bf_story.html?utm_term=.51dc1e1c6f00 (discussing California’s efforts to curb wa-
ter use).  
 7. Bettina Boxall, Lawsuits Over California Water Rights Are a Fight a Century in the 
Making, L.A. TIMES (Jun. 29, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-
water-rights-legal-20150629-story.html. 
 8. Thirty-six thousand water right holders were told in April 2015 to stop diverting 
water from most major river systems. Press Release, Cal. Water Bds., State Water Bd. Warns 
that Water Right Curtailments Are Coming Soon (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.swrcb.ca 
.gov/press_room/press_releases/2015/pr040315_ drought_ curtailments.pdf. 
 9. Dale Kasler & Phillip Reese, Lawsuits Challenge California’s Drought Plan, THE 
SACRAMENTO BEE (June 19, 2015, 3:48 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/business/article 
25022413.html#!. Water restrictions have been particularly been an issue with senior water 
right holders who have held their right for over a century. Id. 
 10. See Press Release, Utah Governor Gary Herbert, Gov. Herbert Encourages Water 
Conservation, Plans for Long-Term Solutions (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.utah.gov/governor/ 
news_media/article.html ?article =20150409-2. 
 11. Jeff DeLong, Summit Brings Call for Nevada Water Law Changes, RENO-
GAZETTE J. (Sept. 25, 2015, 1:13 PM), http://www.rgj.com/story/news/2015/09/25/summit-
brings-call-nevada-water-law-changes/72817234/. 
 12. Arizona is expecting a fifty percent increase in population in the next two decades, 
which would require nineteen percent more water than is currently being consumed. See Abra-
ham Lustgarten, Less Than Zero: Despite Decades of Accepted Science, California and Arizo-
na Are Still Miscounting Their Water Supplies, PROPUBLICA (July 17, 2015), 
https://projects.propublica.org/killing-the-colorado/story/groundwater-drought-california-
arizona-miscounting-water. 
CARLTON.MACRO.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2017  5:13 PM 
409] Drought By Fifth Amendment 
411 
significant limitations and costs. 
Emerging litigation in California highlights the conflict between 
the implementation of water restrictions and the exercise of water 
rights, primarily in the face of exacerbated drought conditions.13 A 
key concern is whether states should compensate water right holders 
for restricting usage. Under the Fifth Amendment, states cannot take 
private property “for public use, without just compensation.”14 Every 
state constitution likewise requires a taking of property be justly 
compensated. This limits the state’s power and helps ensure a prop-
erty owner is made whole after the taking occurs.15Action by states to 
curtail the usage of water raises the question of whether restrictions 
will be considered a taking that compels “just compensation.” This 
paper argues that state and federal courts’ designation of water regu-
lations as takings with the assumption that water rights are traditional 
property perpetuates an outdated system of water regulation that fos-
ters waste and non-conservation in the West. Therefore, to ensure 
states have the power to protect water sources in the long-term, 
courts must revisit the assumption that water rights garner the same 
protection as traditional property. Additionally, the public trust doc-
trine must be raised by courts to allow states to act in the best interest 
of the public when regulating water usage. 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate water regulation consid-
ering the Fifth Amendment and assess federal and state courts’ inter-
pretations of takings jurisprudence to determine the limitations of 
state water conservation efforts. Part II of this Comment discusses 
the history of water rights in the West and the persistence of waste 
and non-conservation by the prior appropriation doctrine. Part III 
surveys federal and state court decisions on the Fifth Amendment re-
garding water takings. Finally, Part IV considers the power of states 
to regulate water use without being subject to the Fifth Amendment’s 
 
 13. Mark Fischetti, U.S. Droughts Will Be the Worst in 1,000 Years, SCI. AMERICAN 
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/u-s-droughts-will-be-the-worst-in-
1-000-years1/. Studies have predicted that advancing climate change will result in “less rain and 
greater soil evaporation,” potentially creating the worst droughts since the twelth and thir-
teenth centuries. Id. 
 14. See Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). 
 15. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893). State 
constitutions provide clauses for eminent domain that require just compensation. See, e.g., 
ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 18; ARIZ. CONST., art. II, § 17; CAL. CONST., art. I, § 19(a); COLO. 
CONST., art. I, § 15; IDAHO CONST., art. I, § 14; MONT. CONST., art. II, § 29; NEV. CONST., 
art. I, § 22; N.M. CONST., art. II, § 20; OR. CONST., art. I, § 18; UTAH CONST., art. I, § 22; 
WYO. CONST., art. I, § 33. 
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just compensation requirement. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF WESTERN WATER RIGHTS 
Roscoe Pound aptly stated that “the courts of America of the 
twentieth century [would] struggl[e] to administer justice to the 
crowded, urban, industrial, heterogeneous population . . . on the basis 
of the judicial organization devised after the revolution for the ho-
mogeneous, rural, pioneer agricultural community of the time.”16 
This is particularly true for the West, as water rights were and con-
tinue to be shaped around agricultural usage.17 Prior to population 
growth in the West, courts developed water rights using the doctrine 
of riparian rights, adopted from England.18 Based on this doctrine, 
the government granted property owners a right to water based on 
the property’s proximity,19 as “[e]very proprietor of lands on the 
banks of a river has naturally an equal right to the use of the water 
which flows in the stream adjacent to his lands.”20 Riparian rights are 
only granted to property owners whose property borders the body of 
water, and each property owner has a right to an equal share of the 
water source. Western states continued to use the doctrine during 
settlement of the West, but climate conditions proved to be a chal-
lenge to the riparian doctrine. 
A. The Rise of Prior Appropriation 
Settlements in the West quickly discovered that riparian rights 
were unworkable with an arid climate and “would have prevented the 
irrigation of the extensive nonriparian lands in the . . . West.”21 Min-
ing heavily influenced the development of new water rights in the 
West, as “[t]he solution was to apply the same doctrine used to settle 
mining claims,”22 which was “the person who is first in time to ap-
 
 16. F. Joyce Cox, The Texas Board of Water Engineers, 7 TEX. L. REV. 86, 87 (1928). 
 17. A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 41 NAT. RES. 
J. 769, 770–71 (2001) [hereinafter Tarlock, Future]. 
 18. ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS 59 (1983). 
 19. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.01 (Amy K. Kelley, ed., 3d ed. LexisNex-
is/Matthew Bender 2015). 
 20. DUNBAR, supra note 18, at 59 (quotation and citation omitted). 
 21. Id. at 60. 
 22. See JOHN W. JOHNSON, UNITED STATES WATER LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 46 
(2009). 
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propriate water is the first in right.”23 Prior appropriation, under the 
two basic principles of priority and beneficial usage, allocates a water 
right to the first person to put a certain quantity of water to beneficial 
use.24 Nineteen states have adopted the doctrine of prior appropria-
tion or a hybrid system,25 consisting of both riparian and prior ap-
propriation rights.26 
1. Priority of water rights 
Prior appropriation helped settle water disputes over who first 
had claim to a water source by creating a system of priority. The rule 
of priority establishes that water needs of earlier claims (senior rights) 
are to be served paramount to any other claim (junior rights). Under 
this rule, “[w]hen water is not sufficient to supply all appropriators, 
senior appropriators make a call and junior users must shut down 
their diversions to enable senior rights holders to fill their needs.”27 
Priority does not give a water right owner the right to possess, but 
rather the right to use—this is a “special type of property right”28 and 
when water flow is insufficient, even senior water rights owners are 
not permitted to draw water. 
Regulation of water rights proved difficult and “[b]y the early 
twentieth century, prior appropriation had evolved into an adminis-
trative system to allocate unused waters on entire stream sys-
tems.”29All states adopted a permit system, requiring that for a water 
right to be granted, a user must show intent to divert the water, put 
the water to beneficial use, and demonstrate their intent in an “open 
physical manner.”30 California’s permit system was enacted in 1914, 
 
 23. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 19, § 12.01. 
 24. A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, Or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L. 
REV. 881, 882 (2000). 
 25. The riparian doctrine was initially used in the West, however, the West eventually 
adopted the prior appropriation doctrine, but rights granted under the riparian doctrine were 
preserved. Thus, a hybrid system was established to respect rights established under the earlier 
doctrine. See JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 57. 
 26. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wy-
oming have adopted the prior appropriation doctrine; whereas California, Kansas, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington have 
adopted a hybrid system. See id. at 303. 
 27. Id. at 52. 
 28. In re McKenna, 346 P.3d 35, 40 (Colo. 2015). 
 29. Tarlock, Future, supra note 17, at 770. 
 30. COLO. DIV. WATER RES., OBTAINING A WATER RIGHT (Dec. 2000), 
http://water.state.co.us/SurfaceWater/ SWRights/Pages/HowGetWaterRights.aspx. 
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after many water rights had already been established, presenting a 
complex system of priority in which riparian rights receive higher 
priority than prior appropriative rights, pre-1914 rights receive prior-
ity over post-1914 rights, and post-1914 rights are last in the line of 
priority.31 
Permit systems allow states to monitor and warn individuals of 
over appropriation of a water source;32 over time states have given au-
thority to administrative agencies to issue permits.33 Administrative 
agencies, specifically state water boards, play a significant role in es-
tablishing the priority of water rights, regulating beneficial use, and 
determining whether the appropriation of water will interfere with 
public interests.34 California’s State Water Board “has two primary 
duties: 1) to determine if surplus water is available and 2) to protect 
the public interest.”35 Other Western states have granted similar ad-
ministrative duties, principally authorizing water boards and depart-
ments to retain substantial control over water usage in light of public 
interests.36 
 
 31. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., THE WATER RIGHTS PROCESS, 
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/ board_info/water_rights_process.shtml (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2015). 
 32. Permits perform the significant role of a recording instrument to establish priority, 
and when a permit application is complete, the water date is recognized as the date the right 
was established. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 19, §15.03. Colorado is the only 
state without a permit system, as the Colorado Constitution prohibits it, but has given authority 
to a water board to oversee the management of water rights. Water rights are instead estab-
lished through litigation once a dispute has arisen. See JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 56. 
 33. Permit systems vary on the type of water they regulate, but most states regulate dif-
fuse surface waters—varying on the exact definition—but typically covering streams, rivers, and 
lakes. See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 19, §15.02. 
 34. See CAL. WATER CODE, § 174–89 (2016), 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgibin/displaycode?section=wat&group= 00001-01000&file=174-
189.; Ssee also 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 19, §15.03. 
 35. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227277 Cal. Rptr. 161, 169 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1986). 
 36. SWRCB has power to halt water diversion by water right holders if dry weather 
conditions continue. State Water Res. Control Bd., State Water Board Drought Year Water 
Actions, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Nov. 2, 2016), 
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/drought/water_availability.s
html; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-105 (2015) (director of the Department of Water Re-
sources given power to regulate water rights); NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.090 (2015) (State Engi-
neer granted significant power of the allocation of water rights); UTAH ADMIN. CODE R655-
14-3 (2015) (state engineer and Utah Division of Water Rights are granted power to protect 
Utah’s water and public welfare). 
CARLTON.MACRO.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2017  5:13 PM 
409] Drought By Fifth Amendment 
415 
2. Beneficial use of water 
Water usage is the key to prior appropriation, unlike land owner-
ship under riparian rights, and for a right to be granted “a person 
must 1) comply with all statutory requirements, and 2) put the water 
to a beneficial purpose. The right remains valid so long as the use 
lasts.”37 Beneficial use conserves water resources by not allowing 
claims for an amount, but instead, only for water that would actually 
be put to use. States typically have a list of uses they recognize as 
beneficial, including domestic use, irrigation, municipal use, stock 
watering, mining, water power, and storage and capture of flood wa-
ters.38 
Nonetheless, beneficial use is not as rigidly enforced as the rule 
of priority. Even though the purpose of beneficial use has been to 
prevent waste of scarce water resources, courts are hesitant to revoke 
allocations of water as “[w]ater rights became more of a general water 
entitlement to use water rather than the right to a specific quantity 
used in a non-wasteful manner as specified by the formal doctrine.”39 
The practice of prior appropriation remains substantially different 
from the formal doctrine developed in the early settlement of the 
West, and has instead evolved from allocating water based on need to 
“a mature mixed administrative-property regime.”40 Rather than suc-
cessfully managing water systems in the West, the prior appropria-
tion doctrine has led to an over allocation of water rights and a de-
cline in water conservation. 
B. The Decline of Beneficial Use and Lack of Water Conservation 
Conservation efforts and enforcement of beneficial usage are un-
dermined by the lack of enforcement by state agencies to punish vio-
lators of water rights—violations including illegal diversion or waste 
of water resources—and instead waste and inefficient incentives per-
vade western water rights. One farmer in Colorado reported, “When 
we have it, we’ll use it . . . . You’ll open your head gate all the way 
 
 37. See JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 45. 
 38. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, § 5:60 (Westlaw, 
July 2015) [hereinafter TARLOCK, LAW]. In some cases, uses of water have moved from being 
deemed beneficial to wasteful, such as the case in Nevada where the legislature prohibited cities 
and counties from using water for artificial lakes and streams. Id. 
 39. Tarlock, Future, supra note 17, at 771. 
 40. Id. 
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and take as much as you can—whether you need it or not.”41 Water 
right holders worry their rights will be lost if they are not used to 
their maximum benefit, even as drought and growth continue to bear 
down on the availability of water. 
Although the doctrine requires the water to be put to a beneficial 
use, prior appropriation has become more of a “shadow doctrine” 
with the creation of dams and earlier history promoting the irrigation 
of land.42 “The principal criticisms are that perpetual ‘use it or lose it 
rights’ lock too much water into marginal agriculture and generally 
encourage inefficient off-stream consumptive uses to the detriment of 
aquatic ecosystem values and the needs of growing urban areas.”43 
The concept of waste in water rights does not necessarily entail the 
excessive use of water, but rather the choice to not conserve it for fu-
ture sustainability.44 For example, older water rights do not need to 
share water with developing water needs and instead “flood deep 
canyons and literally dry up streams, as has happened with some reg-
ularity.”45 Also, states are hesitant to punish violators of restrictions 
on water rights, and in reality “beneficial use” is a loose concept en-
couraging waste and inefficiency.46 Even if waste were to occur, states 
have not clearly defined waste—essentially because it is difficult to 
police water usage for waste; further, state monitoring of water to en-
sure beneficial use is non-existent.47 Even state courts rarely enforce 
beneficial usage, and rather continue to embrace customs of irriga-
tion. For example, to determine the definition of waste, courts look 
to irrigation customs as the standard of whether the water is being 
put to beneficial use.48 This makes it very difficult to break the cycle 
of water waste and locks in to place the old system of water rights 
without any flexibility in changes to supply and demand. 
 
 41. Abraham Lustgarten, Use It or Lose It: Across the West, Exercising One’s Right to 
Waste Water, PROPUBLICA (June 9, 2015), https://projects.propublica.org/killing-the-
colorado/story/wasting-water-out-west-use-it-or-lose-it. 
 42. Tarlock, Future, supra note 17, at 775. 
 43. Id. at 772. 
 44. MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS 
DISAPPEARING WATER 12 (Penguin Books 2d ed., 1993) (1986). 
 45. Ray Huffaker, et al., The Role of Prior Appropriation in Allocating Water Resources 
into the 21st Century, 16 INT’L J. WATER RES. DEV. 265, 267 (2000). 
         46.   Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, And Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for 
Efficiency In Western Water Use, 28 Envtl. L. 919, 955 (1998). 
 47. Karen A. Russell, Wasting Water in the Northwest: Eliminating Waste as a Way of 
Restoring Streamflows, 27 ENVTL. L. 151, 155 (1997). 
 48. Neuman, supra note 46, at 955. 
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The structure of the prior appropriation rights has led to criti-
cism of the incentives of water right holders to maximize use, rather 
than conserve.49 The foremost criticism of the prior appropriation 
doctrine is the lack of flexibility in addressing new demands for wa-
ter.50 Prior appropriation grants a vested property right in a water 
source, and in turn, states are unable to exercise any control over that 
right and “[t]he notion seems to be that to declare an existing use 
wasteful, or non-beneficial, is a sort of prohibited ex post facto law 
that impairs a vested right.”51 
III. THE TAKING OF WATER 
In the face of drought, states have struggled to regulate water us-
age since water rights have been reinforced as a vested property in-
terest. In May and June of 2015, California’s State Water Board is-
sued curtailment notices to senior water rights holders in the 
Western Central Valley region of California, with priority dates of 
1903 or later. The State Water Board ordered water right holders to 
stop the diversion of water due to drought.52 News sources reported 
that many in the region have never had their water curtailed before, 
and in response, farmers and ranchers brought suit.53 In July 2015, 
the Superior Court in Sacramento found the curtailment of water in 
the West Side Irrigation District resulted in a taking of property,54 
and other districts have since brought suits against the State Water 
Board for demanding that senior and junior water rights holders 
cease diversion of water in the Central Valley.55 The State Water 
Board already tried to limit the impact of the court’s ruling to only 
the curtailment notices and not the ability to regulate water resources 
 
 49. Huffaker, supra note 45, at 267. 
 50. Id. at 272–73. 
 51. Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights, and the Future of Water Law, 61 
U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 258 (1990). 
 52. Press Release, State Water Res. Control Bd., 2015 Summary of Water Shortage No-
tices (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/ 
drought/docs/curtail_summary_2015.pdf 2. 
 53. Jim Carlton & Ilan Brat, California Drought Leaves Few Farmers Unscathed, WALL 
STREET J. (July 13, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/california-drought-leaves-few-farmers-
unscathed-1436809802. 
 54. W. Side Irrigation Dist. v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., No. 34-2015-
80002121, 5 (Cal. Sup. Ct. July 10, 2015), 
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/press_room/press_releases /2015/west_ 
side_irr%20_v_cswrcb.pdf. 
 55. Carlton & Brat, supra note 53. 
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in general.56 Yet, California provides a clear example of the struggle 
states will face in regulating water without inviting Fifth Amendment 
claims. 
A. The Takings Clause 
The U.S. Constitution limits government, both state and federal, 
from taking private property without just compensation,57 and a form 
of the “Takings Clause” has also been adopted by every Western 
state in their own constitutions.58 Takings can either occur directly or 
indirectly. A direct taking occurs under the power of eminent do-
main, when the government condemns a property to be used for a 
public purpose and pays compensation for that property.59 An indi-
rect taking arises from an inverse condemnation—physical invasion 
of the property (“physical taking”) or government restrictions placed 
upon the property (“regulatory taking”) to which compensation has 
not been paid.60 
The history of takings has focused on its application to real prop-
erty. The U.S. Supreme Court in recent years has been expanding 
the scope of what constitutes a taking from the original definition, 
where the government physically takes property, to a definition in-
cluding regulatory measures issued by the government limiting what 
property owners can do with their property. The earliest case of ex-
pansion was Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,61 in which the Court held 
that if regulation goes “too far” it is considered a taking and the state 
must compensate the property owner.62 Takings jurisprudence fur-
ther evolved in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,63 
where the Court identified three factors to determine whether a tak-
ing has occurred: 1) the economic impact of the regulation, 2) the 
owner’s reasonable expectations when he invested in the property, 
and 3) the character of the government action, in particular, whether 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV. 
 58. See supra note 15. 
 59. Raymond Dake, Trout of Bounds: The Effects of the Federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peals’ Misguided Fifth Amendment Takings Analysis in Casitas Municipal Water District v. 
United States, 36 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 59, 74 (2011). 
 60. Id. 
 61. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 62. Id. at 415. 
 63. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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the government action could be characterized as a physical invasion 
of the property.64 
Following Penn Central, the Court continued to develop the def-
inition of regulatory takings, including recognizing that a permanent 
physical occupation, however minor, destroys all of the owner’s basic 
property rights and is therefore a taking.65 Regulatory measures that 
deny the property owner all economically beneficial or productive 
use of his land also constitute a taking.66 Nevertheless, the body of 
law surrounding takings has been “described as a ‘mess.’”67 Takings 
jurisprudence has become incoherent due to the number of tests in-
troduced in Mahon, Penn Central, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhat-
tan CATV Corp.,68 and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.69 
The question now is how takings jurisprudence applies to water 
rights. California’s regulation of junior and senior water rights hold-
ers in light of drought conditions displays the predicament of water 
conservation efforts. Further, it raises the question of whether water 
rights should be designated as a vested property interest. And if so, 
what impact does the Fifth Amendment have on water rights? 
B. State Courts and Water Takings 
The introductory inquiry in takings jurisprudence is whether 
there is a property interest to be taken.70 Contemplating water rights, 
many states recognize a vested property interest when the steps to 
appropriation are completed and the state administrative agency 
awards a final decree.71 Early state courts declared water rights as “re-
al property,” essentially giving them the same designation as tradi-
 
 64. Id. at 123. 
 65. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 437–38, 441 
(1982). 
 66. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992). 
 67. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and 
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782 (1995) (quoting Damel A. Farber, Public 
Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 279, 279 (1992); Saul Levmore, Just 
Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L.REV. 285, 287 (1990)). 
 68. 458 U.S. at 441. 
 69. 505 U.S. at 1016. 
 70. See Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 235 P.3d 730, 736 (Utah 2010). The Utah 
Supreme Court has refused “to find a taking in situations where the plaintiffs failed to prove a 
‘vested legally enforceable interest.’” Id. 
 71. James N. Corbridge, Jr., Historical Water Use And The Protection 
Of Vested Rights: A Challenge For Colorado Water Law, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 503, 505 
(1998). 
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tional property rights.72 Idaho73 and New Mexico74 are the only 
courts that continue to acknowledge this, and many states have 
moved away from this concept as several state legislatures deem water 
as belonging to the “public”75 and the appropriation of water only 
gives the water right holder the ‘right to use.’ Vested water rights do 
receive a certain level of protection, and now the question remains 
whether water rights have the same constitutional protections under 
the Fifth Amendment as traditional property rights. State courts have 
made it clear that riparian and appropriative water rights are usufruc-
tuary,76 granting only the right to use and not conferring any private 
ownership in a body of water. The unique nature of water rights 
granting only the right to use presents a difficult determination of 
whether the Fifth Amendment applies when states curtail water 
rights. 
Riparian water rights have long been subject to the takings clause 
under state and federal constitutions. In Franco-American Charo-
laise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court determined that the Oklahoma Legislature could not 
abrogate riparian water rights without compensation, after it had 
passed a statute asserting that riparian water rights were to be limited 
to domestic use.77 It held the statute abolished riparian water rights 
that were vested interests and the abrogation of this right was a con-
stitutional taking.78 Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized 
that “[r]iparian rights are private property within the meaning of the 
Constitution. Where the state makes an improvement for a purpose 
 
 72. See Olson v. Idaho Dept. of Water Res., 666 P.2d 188, 191 (Idaho 1983); Goodwin 
v. Hidalgo Cty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1, 58 S.W.2d 1092, 1094 (Tex. App. 
1933); First Nat. Bank v. Hastings, 42 P. 691, 692 (Colo. App. 1895) (“Water rights for irriga-
tion are regarded as real property.”). 
 73. See Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 252 P.3d 71, 78 (Idaho 2010). 
 74. See Mannick v. Wakeland, 117 P.3d 919, 926 (N.M. 2004) (limiting the concept of 
real property to water rights “generally tied to specific land.”); see also Cooper v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., 49 P.3d 61, 69 (N.M. 2002). 
 75. See ARIZ. REV. STAT., § 45-141; CAL. WATER CODE, § 102; NEV. ADMIN. CODE, § 
445A.67563(2) (“The purchase of water rights, unless the water rights are owned by a public 
water system that is being purchased in an effort to consolidate as part of a program to develop 
the capability of a water system.”); UTAH CODE, § 73–1–1(1). 
 76. See People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859, 864 (Cal. 1980) (both riparian and prior ap-
propriation water rights are usufructuary); Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd., 855 P.2d at 575 
(riparian water rights are usufructuary); Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 842 
(Tex. 2012) (riparian water rights are usufructuary). 
 77. 855 P.2d 568, 572 (Okla. 1990). 
 78. Id. 
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other than the improvement of navigation, which destroys riparian 
rights, the owners of such rights are entitled to compensation for the 
loss they have suffered.”79 There are recognized limitations to ripari-
an water rights, as they may be restricted to reasonable use;80 howev-
er, they are vested water rights attached to the land and cannot be 
eliminated without compensation.81 
Curtailments of vested water rights under the prior appropriation 
doctrine have also been deemed takings by western state courts.82 
This is a rare occurrence, as limitations to water rights have occurred 
primarily in the concepts of beneficial use and priority. Limitations 
under the beneficial usage doctrine, reducing an appropriated water 
right based on wastefulness, do not constitute a taking.83 Yet, state 
courts rarely enforce the concept of water being put to beneficial use, 
as irrigation customs determine the standard for waste, making it dif-
ficult for state administrative agencies to adapt to changing condi-
tions to ensure water is not wasted.84 
Litigation over water rights arises mainly from disputes over the 
administration of priority between junior and senior water right 
holders, rather than conservation issues. States have the capability of 
regulating water rights, without having to pay compensation, to en-
sure water usage does not harm appropriated water rights with higher 
priority. In Kobobel v. State, Dep’t of Natural Resources,85 the Colo-
rado Supreme Court allowed the state water engineer to curtail jun-
ior water rights in favor of senior water rights. This was a result of an 
over-appropriation of water that brought an inherent risk to other 
 
 79. McNamara v. Rittman, 838 N.E.2d 640, 645 (Ohio 2005) (citing State ex. rel. The 
Andersons v. Masheter, 203 N.E.2d 325, 327 (1964)). See also Wernberg v. State, 516 P.2d 
1191, 1194–95 (Alaska 1973) (finding riparian water rights are subject to the Fifth Amendment 
and “[t]hese rights are valuable property, and ordinarily cannot be taken for public use by the 
federal or state governments without payment of just compensation to the landowner.”). 
 80. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900) (finding destruction of riparian water 
rights did not have to be compensated because purpose was not abrogation, but rather, the im-
provement of public waters granted by the Commerce Clause). 
 81. Brusco Towboat Co. v. State, By and Through Straub, 567 P.2d 1037, 1046 (Ore. 
Ct. App. 1977). 
 82. Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 252 P.3d 71, 79 (Idaho 2011) (“When there 
is insufficient water to satisfy both the senior appropriator’s and the junior appropria-
tor’s water rights, giving the junior appropriator a preference to the use of the water constitutes 
a taking for which compensation must be paid.”). 
 83. State Dep’t of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1055 (Wash. 1993) (holding that 
beneficial use operates as a limitation to a vested property right). 
 84. See supra text accompanying note 48. 
 85. 249 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 2011). 
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water rights.86 The threat to water rights arose over the administra-
tive goal to “maximize the beneficial use of all of the waters of [Colo-
rado]” and the court allowed the state to regulate water within the 
limitations of the prior appropriation doctrine.87 The Colorado Su-
preme Court in Kobobel suggested that anything outside of those 
limitations could qualify as a constitutional taking and that the state 
engineer was “merely enforc[ing] Colorado’s long-standing doctrine 
in order to address the injurious effects . . . pumping out of priori-
ty.”88 Regulation of water rights is permitted as it gives “its holder the 
right to use and enjoy the property of another without impairing its 
substance. Thus, one does not ‘own’ water but owns the right to use 
water within the limitations of the prior appropriation doctrine.”89 
The current view of state courts is that there are inherent limita-
tions of the prior appropriation doctrine—beneficial usage and prior-
ity—which allow states to regulate that water within those limita-
tions. Yet, courts have been unable to adapt to the changing 
conditions of water supply and demand in light of drought conditions 
and growing populations. Disputes only arise as to issues of priority, 
and in rare occurrences as to issues of beneficial usage. But they do 
not address the need of the state to regulate a scarce resource in the 
face of changing circumstances. State courts have played a minor role 
in water takings jurisprudence. Instead, federal courts have shaped 
the future of water rights litigation with regards to regulation outside 
the inherent limitations of priority and beneficial usage. 
C. Federal Courts and Water Takings 
The landmark precedent for water takings in the West is Casitas 
Municipal Water District v. United States (“Casitas Municipal Wa-
ter”),90 which held regulation of a water right constituted a physical 
taking.91 In 1956, the Casitas Municipal Water District (“Casitas”) 
and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (“BOR”) entered into a contract 
regarding the Ventura River Project.92 The contract stipulated that 
 
 86. Id. at 1135. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1134. 
 89. Id. (citing Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Colo. 1982)) (inter-
nal quotations omitted). 
 90. 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 91. Id. at 1282.  
 92. Id. at 1281. 
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Casitas would have the “perpetual right to use all water that becomes 
available through the construction and operation of the Project.”93 
Casitas applied to the State Water Board for the appropriation of 
those water rights.94 In 1997, forty years after the project was com-
pleted, West Coast steelhead trout were placed on the endangered 
list of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).95 
Section 9 of the ESA makes it illegal to “take” a species that was 
listed as endangered, and under this law, BOR directed Casitas to “(1) 
construct a fish ladder facility . . . and (2) divert water from the Pro-
ject to the fish ladder, resulting in a permanent loss to Casitas of a 
certain amount of water per year.”96 In 2008, Casitas sued the U.S. 
Government for an unconstitutional taking of the water they lost in 
the diversion. The Federal Circuit made it clear that the Fifth 
Amendment was “designed not to limit the governmental interfer-
ence with property rights per se, but rather to se-
cure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference 
amounting to a taking.”97 Yet, two aspects of the decision in Casitas 
Municipal Water pose significant problems to future regulation of 
water: 1) assuming a usufructuary right is a vested property interest 
and 2) holding water regulation as a physical taking. 
First, the decision in Casitas Municipal Water never directly ad-
dresses whether a water right should be subject to a taking. Similar to 
state courts, the Federal Circuit assumes a water right is a “vested 
property interest.”98 Yet, a water right is much more limited than the 
right associated with traditional property. A water right cannot be 
possessed nor is a water right holder given title. Rather, a water right 
is limited to the allocation of water given based on the usage. Judge 
Mayer, dissenting in Casitas Municipal Water, disagreed with wheth-
er Casitas had a property interest in the water. He argued that a usu-
fructuary interest does not give actual ownership over water, as under 
California law the public owns all water within California territory, 
 
 93. Id. at 1282. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1288 (emphasis in the original) (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Glendale v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987)). 
 98. Id. at 1297 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (Judge Mayer highlights in his dissent that this 
threshold issue of whether a water right even constitutes a property interest was never ad-
dressed by the court). 
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and cannot be “physically invaded or occupied,”99 nor did the gov-
ernment take the water right outright from Casitas and give it to 
someone else.100 He focuses on an important concept that has yet to 
be fully answered by state and federal courts: whether a usufructuary 
right can and should be subject to the takings clause. As already dis-
cussed, many states’ constitutions and water codes hold water as a 
public right rather than a private right. This is too important of a 
threshold question to be based on assumptions when considering 
whether property has been taken. 
Second, the most significant holding the Federal Circuit made in 
Casitas Municipal Water was that the curtailment of Casitas’ water 
right was a “physical taking.”101 Drawing upon prior Supreme Court 
decisions in International Paper Co. v. United States102and United 
States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co.,103 where the government had di-
rectly appropriated water the parties had a right to use, the diversion 
was deemed a “physical taking” by the Court. The issue in Casitas 
Municipal Water differed from this precedent, as the right was “only 
partially impaired.”104 Even though Casitas’ water supply was partial-
ly reduced from having to divert the water to the fish ladder, the 
court regarded the partial reduction amounted to a taking requiring 
the injured parties be compensated.105 
Prior to Casitas Municipal Water, in 2001, the U.S. Federal 
Court of Claims decided a similar case, Tulare Lake Basin Water 
Storage Dist. v. United States (“Tulare Lake”).106 An influential fac-
tor in the decision of the Court of Claims in Tulare Lake and for the 
Federal Circuit in Casitas Municipal Water was the Supreme Court’s 
taking analysis in United States v. Causby.107 The case involved low-
flying planes of the Army and Navy over Causby’s property resulting 
in the death of his chickens, minor property damage, and devaluation 
in the land.108 The Court held it was a physical taking because the 
“frequency and altitude of the flights” made it impossible for the 
 
 99. Id. at 1298 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
 100. Id. at 1297. 
 101. Id. at 1295. 
 102. 282 U.S. 399 (1931). 
 103. 339 U.S. 725 (1950). 
 104. Casitas Mun. Water Dist., 543 F.3d at 1292. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001). 
 107. 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946). 
 108. Id. at 258. 
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landowners to use the land for any purpose, and it was a complete 
loss as if the government had taken exclusive possession.109 Both Tu-
lare Lake and Casitas Municipal Water analogize water rights to 
Causby by declaring that the government had prevented the plaintiffs 
from using the water, and thus, the water right became valueless.110 
In using the Causby analysis, both Tulare Lake and Casitas Munici-
pal Water disregard previous Supreme Court caution against treating 
all interference as per se takings, as they could “transform govern-
ment regulation into a luxury few governments could afford.”111 The 
Court thought that “[b]y contrast, physical appropriations are rela-
tively rare, [and] easily identified . . . .”112 
Designation of the reduction in water as a “physical taking” has 
been substantially criticized for the impact it will have on water 
law.113 The Federal Circuit concluded that the diversion was a physi-
cal taking based on the idea that the government commandeered the 
water “for a public use”—the preservation of an endangered species. 
When the government commandeered the water by diverting it to 
the fish ladder, it took Casitas’ water.114 “The water, and Casitas’ 
right to use that water, [was] forever gone.”115 Shortly after Casitas 
Municipal Water, concern arose that the Federal Circuit’s decision 
“could potentially convert every regulation of water use into an un-
constitutional taking and basically freeze the government in its 
tracks.”116 
The Federal Circuit and Court of Claims analysis of water rights 
as a physical taking is flawed because it is inconsistent with the nature 
of water rights. Water rights lack the physical occupation aspect that 
is used in real property takings. Professor John D. Echeverria states, 
 
 109. Id. at 261. 
 110. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 49 Fed. Cl. at 319; Casitas Mun. Water 
Dist., 543 F.3d at 1294. 
 111. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324 
(2002).  
 112. Id. 
 113. See Dake, supra note 59, at 111–21 (discussing the impact the designation “physical 
taking” will have on states with depleting sources in trying to regulate groundwater consump-
tion); A. Dan Tarlock, Takings, Water Rights, And Climate Change, 36 VT. L. REV. 731, 754 
(2011–2012) (“The curtailment of a seasonable delivery obligation does not disturb the under-
lying property or contract right, and thus the proper analysis is the Court’s temporary takings 
doctrine.”). 
 114. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist., 543 F.3d at 1294. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Dake, supra note 59, at 111. 
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“the physical occupation theory cannot logically be applied to a water 
right” because there is no physical property to occupy; rather water is 
merely a right to use.117 Professor Echeverria states that the analysis 
by the Court of Claims has given “property rights in water greater 
protection than any other type of property known to the law” and 
this protection “is inconsistent with the traditionally limited and con-
tingent nature of private rights in water.”118 The contingency of pri-
vate water rights rests on the fact that “private rights in water are 
subject to greater demands on behalf of the public welfare, and there-
fore are less appropriate for treatment using a per se takings rule than 
other types of property rights.”119 
The concern with Casitas Municipal Water is that any regulation 
of water that results in a diminution of a water right could cause a 
significant amount of compensation. For a physical taking, the gov-
ernment is required to fully compensate the property for the full val-
ue of the property taken.120 Regulatory takings require the govern-
ment to compensate only when the regulation “deprives land of all 
economically beneficial use.”121 The Casitas Municipal Water deci-
sion could result in compensation as much as $1,349,000,122  and the 
Tulare Lake decision resulted in the government settling for $16.7 
million with the water district.123 Compensation of this magnitude 
may deter states from taking any action that would result in any slight 
diminution of water rights, and further, it could frustrate the ability 
of state legislatures to enact regulation towards water conservation. 
 
 117. John D. Echeverria, Why Tulare Lake Was Incorrectly Decided, GEO. ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y INST.14 (Aug. 2005), http://www.gelpi.org/gelpi/current_research/documents/ 
RT_Pubs_Law_TulareLakeIncorrect.pdf. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (quoting First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987)). 
 121. Lucas, 505 U.S at 1027; see also Richard A. Epstein, Physical and Regulatory Tak-
ings: One Distinction Too Many, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 99 (Mar. 1, 2012), 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/physical-regulatory-takings#footnote_5 (explaining 
that the structure of physical and regulatory is already criticized for the unfair outcomes it can 
lead to, as “a physical occupation with trivial economic consequences gets full compensation. In 
contrast, major regulatory initiatives rarely require a penny in compensation for millions of dol-
lars in economic losses.”). 
 122. Dake, supra note 59, at 111–12. This estimation is based on $100–$1000 per acre-
foot from data gathered for Tulare case. Id. However, on remand the trial court found the tak-
ings claim was not yet ripe for Casitas because it had not yet impacted beneficial use. Casitas 
Municipal Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 478 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that 
the claim was not yet ripe for adjudication), aff’d 708 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 123. Echeverria, supra note 117, at 1. 
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California has already witnessed that courts will hold any restriction 
on water in an effort to curb usage as a constitutional taking, causing 
the State Water Board to retreat from any effort to curtail water 
rights.124  
IV. BALANCING THE WATER RIGHT WITH STATE POWER 
The question now remains how courts can create flexibility for 
state legislatures with regard to water regulation without running 
afoul of the Fifth Amendment. The state and federal courts have cre-
ated two obstacles that must be addressed in future takings litigation: 
1) the treatment of water as a private vested property interest; and 2) 
the designation of water regulation as a physical taking. Precedent 
requires “just compensation” to water right holders in the event of 
water regulation, so how can courts address the need for water con-
servation without triggering the Fifth Amendment protections? 
Courts will have to recognize, first, that water rights are not subject 
to the same treatment as traditional private property interests and 
state regulation of water is permitted under the police power; and 
second, that the public trust doctrine gives public interests priority 
over private water rights. 
A. Water Systems Belong to the Public 
Treatment of water rights as private property by federal and state 
courts is in direct conflict with state statutes and constitutions that 
treat water systems as belonging to the public. The designation of 
permanent public ownership in state constitutions entrusts the state 
with managing and protecting water sources for the benefit of the 
public, and is typically referred to as the public trust doctrine. This 
doctrine has long existed in water rights as they are “subject to a sort 
of easement for public navigation and fishing”125 from which courts 
acknowledge that state administrative agencies are authorized “to re-
consider past water rights decisions in light of modern public 
 
 124. See Press Release, Cal. Water Bds., State Water Board Issues Statement On West 
Side Irrigation District Court Challenge (July 10, 2015), 
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/press_room/press_releases/2015/ 
pr071015_westside_statement.pdf.  
 125. James L. Huffman, Avoiding The Takings Clause Through The Myth Of Public 
Rights: The Public Trust And Reserved Rights Doctrines At Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. 
L. 171, 180 (1987). 
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needs”126 without Fifth Amendment implications.127 Placing public 
interests paramount has broad implications for prior appropriation, 
particularly as the West continues to experience growth. California 
deems “[a]ll water within the State . . . the property of the people of 
the State.”128 States are entrusted to protect their water systems and, 
therefore, any exercise of water rights “is subject to state administra-
tion and enforcement.”129  
In some instances, states have already taken measures to sustain 
water sources by instituting “minimum instream flow” require-
ments.130 Colorado is one of these states and has given its water board 
the authority to determine what “may be required for minimum 
stream flows or for natural surface water levels or volumes for natural 
lakes to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree.”131 
Yet, states’ intent to protect water sources conflicts with the appro-
priation structure and the court’s view of water as a “vested property 
interest.”132 The California Constitution recognizes water as belong-
ing to the public, subject to state regulation and control, and limits 
water to reasonable use allowing for the legislature to “enact laws in 
the furtherance of [this] policy.”133 Unlike riparian water rights, prior 
appropriation has continually been subject to regulation; a property 
owner has no guarantee they will receive water. In particular, water 
rights have never been exclusively private or possessory by one prop-
erty owner.134 
Nonetheless, courts have not recognized the priority of public 
needs in water rights, and rather, private property rights continually 
protect water rights. The view is that water is entitled to the same 
protection as land under takings jurisprudence. But, the Court’s deci-
sion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council suggests that gov-
ernment regulation or taking of vested property rights are not always 
to be perceived by courts as per se takings; rather, there is room for 
 
 126. Roderick E. Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Context, 29 
NAT. RES. J. 585, 589 (1989). 
 127. Id. at 590–91. 
 128. CAL. WATER CODE, § 102 (West 2016).  
 129. Reed D. Benson, Maintain the Status Quo: Protecting Established Water Uses in the 
Pacific Northwest, Despite the Rules of Prior Appropriation, 28 ENV’T. L. 881, 886 (1998). 
 130. See WASH. REV. CODE. §§ 90.92.080, 90.22.010 (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-2,115 
(2014). 
 131. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2015). 
 132. WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 19, at § 15.03.  
 133. See CAL. CONST. art. 10, §§ 2, 5. 
       134.   See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
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flexibility in takings jurisprudence in light of states’ power over those 
rights.135 There are two principles of takings jurisprudence to be 
drawn from Lucas: first, the background principles of property rights 
include an understood limitation; and second, the restrictions placed 
on that right are a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power.  
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, proposed that when a state 
implements regulation that deprives an owner of all beneficial use, 
the preliminary inquiry should be whether the property interest was 
even “part of [the] title to begin with.”136 Further, Justice Scalia rec-
ognized that property rights are not without their limitations as the 
police power acts as a constraint on property rights and a property 
owner “ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation 
might even render his property economically worthless.137 
First, background principles of property rights provide limita-
tions of what a property owner can do with a vested property interest. 
Originating in either state or federal law,138 background principles 
provide an affirmative defense to takings claims to which the gov-
ernment has the burden of proof in proving that background princi-
ples allow them to regulate the property right without triggering the 
Fifth Amendment.139 Riparian water rights have already evoked the 
background principles of property rights in establishing preexisting 
easements of navigation and fishing. In water takings, courts have not 
raised the perspective of Lucas’ background principles of property 
rights in regards to appropriative water rights. In Tulare Lake, “[t]he 
court recognized that various California legal rules potentially repre-
sented ‘background principles’ under Lucas . . . .”140 Yet, the state 
failed to raise those principles regarding water use—particularly ben-
eficial use and public trust doctrine —“but determined that since the 
state of California failed to invoke available state rules imposing lim-
its on water use . . . the federal government could not rely on them to 
defend its species regulation.”141 
 
 135. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 1027–28. 
 138. Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise Of Back-
ground Principles As Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 328 
(2005). 
 139. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030. 
 140. Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 138, at 329. 
 141. Id. 
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Second, even as takings jurisprudence remains a “mess,”142 Lucas 
highlighted the role of the police power, as recognized by Justice 
Holmes in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter.143 Justice 
Holmes acknowledged that “[a]ll rights tend to declare themselves to 
the absolute extreme” when they are in fact subject to the limitation 
by “the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than 
those on which the particular right is founded, and which become 
strong enough to hold their own when a certain point is reached.”144 
Background principles of water rights have always been subject to the 
police power of a state, even in the early establishment of prior ap-
propriation, as was recognized in Tulare Lake. Prior appropriation in 
its early establishment never guaranteed an absolute right to the wa-
ter, just the use of a particular amount that over time could be modi-
fied. 
However, courts have been unwilling to recognize those limita-
tions in the face of changing circumstances that require regulation of 
water. One of the strongest limitations in all of property is when a 
property right is exercised in a manner that is ‘harmful or noxious ’145 
Inherent in the background principles of water rights are that public 
needs have priority over private water rights. That is not to say the 
harm justifies a regulatory taking, but rather, it gives rise to the use of 
the police power to regulate without compensation because the 
harmful use was never recognized as part of the property right to 
begin with.146 In both regulatory and physical takings, the govern-
ment can avoid compensation if “the nature of the owner’s estate 
shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to 
begin with.”147 This concept is the crux of the ability of states to 
regulate water rights without compensation, as water rights were 
never intended to be absolute. Within the background principle of 
prior appropriation, water rights could not be exercised to harm ear-
lier established rights, including public interests. Thus, water has 
never been a “vested property interest” in the traditional sense, and 
 
 142. Commentary on takings jurisprudence has recognized the messiness of the doctrine. 
See Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New 
Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265, 285 (1996); J. Peter Bryne, Ten Arguments 
for the Abolition of the Takings Doctrine, 22 ECO. L. Q. 89, 90 (1995). 
 143. 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026 (1992). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 1027. 
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instead, remains a right limited to the extent it harms public rights. 
Further, as will be discussed in the next section, the priority of public 
interest also remains a background principle of property with respect 
to the public trust doctrine, a property principle adopted from Eng-
lish common law. 
B. Applying the Public Trust Doctrine 
One important background principle of property that places a 
limitation upon a property owner is the public trust doctrine. U.S. 
courts first raised the public trust doctrine in Illinois Central Railroad 
Co. v. Illinois,148 in which the Supreme Court held that the sovereign 
(state or federal) owns all of the navigable waterways and lands lying 
beneath them as a trustee for the benefit of the public.149 “[P]eople of 
the state [own and] . . . may enjoy navigation of the waters, carry on 
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein.”150 Created 
for navigable waterways, courts have contemplated the public trust 
doctrine as a remedy to expand beyond navigable waters and tide-
lands; Tulare Lake Basin even emphasized that the government had 
failed to raise the “public trust doctrine.”151 Courts in California and 
North Dakota recognize the doctrine; the North Dakota Supreme 
Court recognizes that the public trust doctrine plays an expanding 
role in environment law and suggests the doctrine requires “as a min-
imum, evidence of some planning by appropriate state agencies and 
officers in the allocation of public water resources.”152 California has 
expanded their use of the doctrine—evident in their landmark deci-
sion in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court.153 
The California Supreme Court in National Audubon Society 
held that the principle of public trust prevents any party from acquir-
ing a vested right to appropriate water in a manner harmful to the in-
terests protected by the public trust.154 The case involved the City of 
 
 148. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
 149. Id. at 120–22. 
 150. Id. at 118. 
 151. Tulare Lake Water Basin Water Storage Dist. V. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 332 
(2001) (“Thus, while we accept the proposition that plaintiffs have no right to use or di-
vert water in an unreasonable manner, nor in a way that violates the public trust, the issue now 
before us is whether such a determination has in fact been made.”). 
 152. United Plainsmen Ass’n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm’n, 247 N.W.2d 
457, 463 (N.D. 1976). 
 153. 658 P.2d 709 (1983) (en banc). 
 154. Id. at 712. 
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Los Angeles’s diversion of four of the five tributaries into Mono 
Lake, a large saline lake located near the Sierra Nevada mountain 
range, to which they had been granted appropriative rights. The di-
version caused the level of the lake to drop, and “surface area has di-
minished by one-third; one of the two principal islands in the lake has 
become a peninsula, exposing the gull rookery there to coyotes and 
other predators and causing the gulls to abandon the former is-
land.”155 National Audubon Society, a non-profit organization fo-
cused on wildlife conservation, brought suit against the City of Los 
Angeles claiming the lake was protected by the public trust.156 Na-
tional Audubon Society claimed Mono Lake would continue to di-
minish and harm not only wildlife but also the public, as the exposed 
lakebed would result in airborne dust “irritat[ing] the mucous mem-
branes and respiratory systems of humans and other animals.”157 The 
California Supreme Court addressed in National Audubon Society 
the interaction between the public trust doctrine and the water rights 
system.158 
To determine how the public trust doctrine applied to Califor-
nia’s water system, the court examined the 1) purpose, 2) scope, and 
3) duties and power of the trustee.159 First, the purpose of the trust 
was to protect public rights of navigation and fishing, yet it has since 
expanded to tidelands (i.e. Illinois Central Railroad Co.), and in some 
cases, the protection of ecosystems.160 Second, the scope of the trust 
historically applied to navigable waterways; however, the court ex-
panded the scope of the trust to “beds, shores and waters” of lakes 
that “are without question protected.”161 The court’s justification for 
expanding the doctrine was based on earlier California Supreme 
Court cases that used the doctrine to prevent mining companies from 
dumping fill into rivers that prevented navigation, caused water pol-
 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 716. The threat to the public was not exactly determined, but a similar occur-
rence happened in Owens Valley, California. The City of Los Angeles diverted water from 
Owens Lake and the lakebed became exposed resulting in air quality issues. Los Angeles later 
reached a settlement for the air quality issues in Owens Valley. See Times Editorial Board, Edi-
torial, 100 Years Later, The Dust Settles In The Owens Valley, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2014, 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-owens-valley-settlement-20141116-
story.html. 
 158. Id. at 717. 
 159. Id. at 719. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 720. 
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lution, and potentially “creat[ed] the danger that in time of flood the 
rivers would turn from their channels and inundate nearby lands.”162 
The expansion of the public trust doctrine by the California Supreme 
Court suggests that the doctrine could reach as far as non-navigable 
waters, so long as they intersect, as “it should equally apply to con-
strain the extraction of water that destroys navigation and other pub-
lic interests.”163 Third and finally, the duties and powers of the trus-
tee are to supervise and ensure that no vested right holder “use[s] 
those rights” to harm the trust.164 Further, the court recognized that 
as a usufructuary right, water could not be owned and the right was 
limited to use. California, in 1926, passed a constitutional amend-
ment, Article 10, altering water rights by subjecting them to reasona-
ble use. After the legislature passed the amendment, it granted the 
State Water Board incremental power to supervise and oversee the 
water rights system.165 
Part of this power was to administer the public trust, as Califor-
nia’s alteration of water rights included making public needs superior 
to any subsequent rights. Addressing concerns about water rights that 
existed prior to the constitutional change, the court stated: 
Once the state has approved an appropriation, the public trust im-
poses a duty of continuing supervision over the taking and use of 
the appropriated water. In exercising its sovereign power to allocate 
water resources in the public interest, the state is not confined by 
past allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light of current 
knowledge or inconsistent with current needs. 
The state accordingly has the power to reconsider allocation deci-
sions even though those decisions were made after due considera-
tion of their effect on the public trust. The case for reconsidering a 
particular decision, however, is even stronger when that decision 
failed to weigh and consider public trust uses.166 
This does not guarantee that the public trust will prevail over ap-
propriative rights in every instance that the State Water Board cur-
tails water, rather the public trust will only be invoked when they 
“consider the effect of such diversions upon interests protected by the 
public trust, and attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid or minimize any 
 
 162. Id. at 720. 
 163. Id. at 721. 
 164. Id. at 720. 
 165. Id. at 725. 
 166. Id. at 728. 
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harm to those interests.”167 Nonetheless, the California Supreme 
Court granted substantial power to the state to regulate water to en-
sure the public interests are not harmed by appropriated water rights. 
National Audubon Society has been acknowledged by states as a 
way to assert control over water allocation.168 Alaska,169 Arizona,170 
Idaho,171 Hawaii,172 Montana,173 Nevada,174 North Dakota,175 South 
Dakota,176and Washington177 recognize “the connection between wa-
ter rights and the public trust law.”178 However, the rise of the public 
trust doctrine over appropriative rights does not give the state unlim-
ited power to regulate water, but gives the state power as a trustee to 
preserve water sources, as a trust, “so far as consistent with the public 
interest.”179 The power granted to the State to regulate water alloca-
tion does not conflict with the Supreme Court’s view of takings in 
Lucas; rather, the majority created flexibility within takings jurispru-
dence for states to regulate property interests so long as the back-
ground property principles have recognized restrictions on the prop-
erty right. Casitas Municipal Water did not take into account the 
restrictions on water rights with regard to the public trust doctrine; 
 
 167. Id. at 712. 
 168. See Michelle Bryan Mudd, Hitching Our Wagon To A Dim Star: Why Outmoded 
Water Codes And “Public Interest” Review Cannot Protect The Public Trust In Western Wa-
ter Law, 32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 297–98 (2013) (explaining that many states after National 
Audubon Society have tried to adopt the public trust doctrine in their water codes). 
 169. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, §§ 3, 13; see also Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 60–61 
(Alaska 1996) (recognizing the public trust doctrine as established in the Alaskan Constitution). 
 170. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Super. Ct. ex rel. Cty of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199 
(Ariz. 1999) (rejecting the legislature’s intent to abolish the public trust doctrine). 
 171. See Kootenai Envtl. All. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085, 1094 (Idaho 
1983) (citing the reasoning of Nat’l Audubon Soc’y in recognition of the public trust doctrine). 
 172. HAW. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 7 (1978); see also In re Water Use Permit Applications, 
9 P.3d 409, 445, 453 (Haw. 2000) (citing the reasoning of Nat’l Audubon Soc’y in recognizing 
the public trust doctrine, which is also established in the Hawaiian Constitution). 
 173. See Montana Trout Unlimited v. Beaverhead Water Co., 255 P.3d 179, 185–86 
(Mont. 2011) (recognizing the existence of the public trust doctrine for recreational use of 
Montana’s waters). 
 174. See Lawrence v. Clark Cty., 254 P.3d 606, 612–13 (Nev. 2011) (acknowledging that 
water within Nevada belongs to the public and provides grounding for the public trust doc-
trine). 
 175. See United Plainsmen Ass’n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm’n, 247 
N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976). 
 176. See Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 838 (S.D. 2004) (citing that history and prec-
edent have led to the public trust doctrine). 
 177. See Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 234 (Wash. 1993) (finding that 
the public trust doctrine comes from the state water code). 
 178. Mudd, supra note 168, at 304. 
 179. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 728. 
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therefore, the physical takings analysis remains flawed and should not 
be adopted by future courts.180 Yet, takings jurisprudence is recog-
nized as incoherent181 and one cannot blame lower courts for strug-
gling to make sense of the Supreme Court’s evolving view of takings. 
Within takings jurisprudence, California remains an outlier in re-
gards to water takings, as many states have yet to afford their water 
boards the same power that California has. So what does this mean 
for western states? Western state legislatures and courts will have to 
recognize the need for change to their water rights systems—not just 
pertaining to the lack of oversight and regulation, but also the power 
administrative agencies have in asserting their rights of regulation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The water crisis in the West has highlighted a need for change in 
western water systems. Yet, state and federal courts continue to pre-
serve an outdated system that puts the supply of water in the West in 
jeopardy. Even as history led to the creation of regulatory systems to 
monitor and oversee water rights, significant obstacles remain for 
states in their ability to exercise that power. Courts should reconsider 
the designation of water regulations as takings by recognizing the 
background principles of property rights. 
First, water should not be considered a “vested property interest” 
to be possessed or owned, but rather, should be subject to state police 
power to regulate and restrict water based on priority and beneficial 
use. Second, water rights are subject to the public trust doctrine that 
protects the public interest in water resources. Therefore, public in-
terests should be prioritized over private rights in the face of signifi-
cant threats to water sources. A compelling government interest 
needs to be recognized that in order to protect water sources for fu-
ture sustainability, the public interest outweighs private rights to wa-
ter. The difficulty for courts will be finding a balance between private 
water rights and public needs to ensure that neither put the other at 
risk of significant harm. 
It is apparent that water rights can no longer remain entrenched 
in past customs of irrigation and usage. Water rights should instead 
 
 180. Judge Mayer raised this issue in his dissent that California subjects appropriated wa-
ters to reasonable use and the public trust doctrine. Casitas Municipal Water Dist. v. United 
States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
 181. See Treanor, supra note 67, at 812. 
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embrace change that seeks to ensure long-term water preservation. 
To address the need for change, courts must first recognize the limi-
tations of water rights inherent in the history of prior appropriation, 
namely, that water rights holders are limited to a right to use. Sec-
ond, courts must recognize that the public trust doctrine grants states 
the ability to regulate water systems with concern to public needs. 
The connection between water rights and the public trust doctrine 
allows public interests to be prioritized before all other water right 
holders. These considerations are necessary to make certain that 
states do not trigger the compensation requirement of the Fifth 
Amendment and create an onslaught of compensation with the 
slightest reduction in water usage. These considerations will give 
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